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ABSTRACT
We develop and apply a discriminating criterion to distinguish the two principal paradigms of
international trade theory: constant-returns perfectly competitive models on the one hand, and
increasing-returns monopolistically competitive models on the other. Our criterion rests on the
existence of home-biased demand. It predicts a positive relationship between countries’ relative
output and their relative home bias in increasing-returns sectors, and no relationship in
constant-returns sectors. In implementing the test on data for OECD countries we find that
industries accounting for up to two thirds of manufacturing output conform to the increasing-
returns monopolistically competitive model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International trade theory is dominated by two major paradigms. One paradigm belongs to the
neo-classical world with constant returns to scale in production (CRS) and perfectly
competitive product markets (PC). The other paradigm rests on the assumption of increasing
returns to scale (IRS) and, in its most prominent formulation, monopolistically competitive
markets (MC). While other important models exist which combine features of both paradigms,
the theoretical and empirical debate has concentrated on these two powerful benchmark cases.
To distinguish between these two paradigms is of more than academic interest. Trade policies,
market integration, migration, and other economic changes may have very different positive
and welfare consequences depending on the underlying paradigm. It is therefore important to
find a way of distinguishing the two paradigms in the data, and to quantify their respective
importance in shaping industrial specialisation patterns. This is the purpose of our study.
In the theoretical part, we develop a discriminating criterion suitable for empirical estimation.
The discriminating criterion relies on the assumption that demand is home biased. It posits that
the home bias influences the pattern of international specialisation in sectors that are
characterised by increasing returns and monopolistic competition while such bias is
inconsequential for sectors characterised by constant returns and perfect competition. We test
this hypothesis in 29 industries, covering 22 OECD countries for 1970-85. Our results suggest
that 17 industries, accounting for about two thirds of industrial output, can be associated with
the IRS-MC paradigm, while 11 industries can be associated with the CRS-PC paradigm. For
one industry the results are inconclusive.3
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide a selective review of the relevant
literature. Section III sets out our theoretical model and derives the discriminatory hypothesis.
We operationalise this test empirically in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
II.1 Searching for Evidence of Increasing Returns in Industrial Specialisation Patterns
Several studies have attempted to gauge the relative explanatory power of the two main
paradigms in trade theory directly or indirectly. A first group of studies pertains to the empirical
industrial organisation literature (for reviews see Scherer and Ross, 1990; and Tybout, 1993).
These studies estimate the incidence of plant-level increasing returns directly and generally do
not find them to be pervasive. Estimates of industries’ susceptibility to scale economies were
analysed in conjunction with measures of industrial specialisation across the US states (Kim,
1995) and across EU countries and regions (Brülhart, 1998), and it was diagnosed that “scale-
driven” geographical specialisation was mainly a phenomenon of the past.
A second group of studies focused on intra-industry trade as evidence of the importance of the
IRS-MC paradigm (see Greenaway and Milner, 1986; and, for a critical appraisal, Leamer and
Levinsohn, 1995). Since intra-industry trade was generally associated with IRS-MC models, the
observed large and increasing shares of intra-industry trade were interpreted as evidence of the
growing relevance of non-neoclassical trade models. This evidence became less persuasive
when some studies, like Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and Davis (1995), demonstrated that
intra-industry trade could also be generated in suitably amended versions of the CRS-PC
framework.4
A third approach was to enlist the excellent empirical performance of the gravity equation in
support of the IRS-MC paradigm, since the gravity equation has a straightforward theoretical
counterpart in the IRS-MC model (Helpman, 1987). This view was challenged by studies that
showed that the gravity equation can also arise in a variety of other models (Davis and
Weinstein, 1998b; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 1998; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose,
1999; Haveman and Hummels, 1997). On the empirical grounds, the challenge came from the
evidence that the gravity equation fits excellently also on the set of non-OECD countries, a
piece of evidence at odds with the assumptions of the IRS-MC paradigm (Hummels and
Levinsohn, 1995).
II.2 The Magnification Effect
The scope of the relevant empirical literature has until recently been limited by the lack of a
testable discriminating hypothesis that could serve to distinguish among theoretical paradigms
in statistically rigorous fashion. A major breakthrough in this direction came in a series of
papers by Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1998a, 1999). They developed a separation criterion
based on the feature of IRS-MC models that demand idiosyncrasies are reflected in the pattern
of specialisation more than one for one, thus giving rise to a magnification effect (pointed out
originally in Krugman, 1980). Conversely, in a CRS-PC model, there is no magnification effect.
Hence, with IRS-MC, a country will tend to export those goods on which it spends a larger
share of its income than the world as a whole, and import those on which it spends a relatively
smaller income share; and the reverse with CRS-PC. This feature can serve as the basis for
empirical investigation. Sectors that exhibit the magnification effect are associated with the
IRS-MC paradigm, while sectors that do not exhibit the magnification effect are associated with
CRS-PC. Davis and Weinstein have estimated the magnification effect empirically in data for
OECD countries (1996, 1998a) and for Japanese regions (1999), which allowed them to5
attribute industrial sectors to one of the two paradigms. In their first paper with international
data (1996) they have found little evidence of the magnification effect and therefore scant
support for increasing returns. However, in their later studies, which took account of cross-
border demand dissipation (1998a) and of region-level specialisation patterns (1999), they
produced evidence of pervasive magnification effects, suggesting that over half of industrial
output was in industries that conform with the IRS-MC paradigm.
The Davis-Weinstein test is intuitively compelling and marks a significant step in bringing
rigour to the empirical analysis of the new trade theory. Its major advantage is that it provides a
reduced form that is common to all model variants within the IRS-MC paradigm, and absent
from all models in the CRS-PC vein. Thus, it makes possible to distinguish between paradigms
without having to examine and compare each of the multidimensional features of each of the
paradigms (such as product differentiation or homogeneity, scale economies or constant returns,
perfect competition or imperfect competition, etc). Of course, the test should not be interpreted
literally, since no model in the CRS-PC or in the IRS-MC family is a precise description of any
real-world economic sector. Yet, we may think it reasonable to believe that each real-world
industry will resemble one of the two classes of models more than the other.
The magnification effect is only valid as a separation criterion if it is truly general to all (or to
“all reasonable”) models of one class and to none of the other. It is therefore important that this
discriminating criterion be subjected to theoretical as well as empirical “sensitivity tests”, so as
to explore its robustness and degree of generality. Some papers have pointed out limits to the
applicability of the magnification effect as a discriminatory criterion. Feenstra, Markusen and
Rose (1999) find that the magnification effect may be generated also in CRS models with
reciprocal dumping. Instead of the magnification effect they use a discriminating criterion6
according to which, in a gravity equation, the income elasticity of exports should be higher for
differentiated goods than for homogeneous commodities. Head and Ries (1999) also show that
the magnification effect can arise in settings that do not necessarily conform with the IRS-MC
paradigm.
Another aspect of the test based on the magnification effect is that it appears to be sensitive to
the modelling of trade costs. As outlined above, the empirical results of the two Davis-
Weinstein (1996, 1998a) studies on OECD data differ substantially as a result of different
assumptions about the effect of national borders on demand. In the purely theoretical context,
Davis (1998) has pointed out that the magnification effect hinges on the relative size of trade
costs in the CRS and IRS sectors, and that it vanishes if equal trade costs arise in both types of
sectors. Head and Ries (1999) have turned this sensitivity to trade costs into a useful feature.
They find that the size of the magnification effect increases with trade costs in CRS sectors and
decreases with trade costs in IRS sectors, and they use this feature as a discriminating criterion.
Our discriminating criterion does not depend on the presence of trade costs, and it remains valid
even if trade costs are zero. This is an attractive feature given the fragility of the magnification
effect with respect to assumptions about trade costs.
Turning to our contribution in this paper, we allow for the widely documented reality that goods
from different countries are ipso facto considered imperfect substitutes (the Armington
assumption), and that buyers are for a variety of reasons biased in favour of either home- or
foreign-produced goods.1 In such a model, a different type of home-market effect emerges, one
that arises from the relative degree of home bias in expenditure. Our theoretical result is as
                                               
1 Feenstra et al. (1999) and Head and Ries (1999) have used the Armington assumption in a similar context. Note
that we parametrise the home bias in the utility function instead of defining it in terms of the income elasticity of
imports, as in, e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller (1999).7
follows. In an IRS-MC setting, relatively strong home bias in a country’s aggregate expenditure
on a good will make the country relatively specialised in the production of that good; whereas
in a CRS-PC framework, relative home biases have no impact on the location of production.
This result forms the basis for our empirical separation criterion.
Our model hinges on the existence of home-biased demand. We argue that this is a sensible
claim, given the strong empirical evidence in its support. For example, Winters (1984) argued
that, while demand for imports is not completely separable from demand for domestic goods,
substitution elasticities between home and foreign goods are nevertheless finite. Davis and
Weinstein (1998b) and Trefler (1995) found that by allowing for home-biased demand the
predictive power of the HOV model could be improved very significantly. Head and Mayer
(1998) identify home bias in expenditure as one of the most potent sources of market
fragmentation in Europe. McCallum (1995), Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1996, 1997) find that
trade volumes among regions within countries are generally a multiple of trade volumes among
different countries even after controlling for geographical distance and other barriers. Finally,
Brülhart and Trionfetti (1998) find evidence of home bias in public procurement. The
assumption of home bias therefore seems to rest on solid empirical grounds.
III. THEORY: DERIVATION OF A DISCRIMINATING CRITERION
A model suitable for our analysis needs to accommodate both the CRS-PC and the IRS-MC
paradigms. For this purpose, we use a framework close to that of Helpman and Krugman (1985,
part III).11
equilibrium condition in the market for CRS good Y. By Walras’ law, the equilibrium condition
for the other CRS good Z is redundant. The model so far is standard except for the home bias.
The system (1)-(6) is composed of eleven independent equations and twelve unknowns (pX, pY,
pZ, x, n1, n2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2, w, r). Taking pZ as the numéraire, the system is perfectly determined.
In the absence of trade costs, equations (4) and (5) are not independent. Hence, a two-by-two
model would guarantee full dimensionality of the factor-price-equalisation set (eight
independent equations and nine unknowns). The presence of trade costs segments the market
for the differentiated commodity and, therefore, requires two equations for that market. Thus, in
the presence of trade costs, a two-by-two model would have too many equations for the factor-
price-equalisation set to be of full dimensionality. To restore full dimensionality we need one
more commodity. This is why we use a three-by-two model. While it is analytically convenient
to work within the factor-price-equalisation space, our results do not depend on its existence.
Under appropriate conditions, the dimensionality of the model could be extended to any V, S,
and i, with S >V.
III.4 A Discriminating Criterion
There is a difference between the two CRS-PC sectors and the IRS-MC sector that can be
immediately found by inspection of equations (4)-(6). The difference is that the parameter
representing the home bias cancels out of equation (6), while it does not cancel out in equations
(4) and (5). Hence, the home bias does not affect international specialisation in the CRS-PC
sectors but it affects international specialisation in the IRS-MC sectors. This is the essence of
our discriminating criterion. We associate sectors with the IRS-MC paradigm if the home bias
is significant in explaining international specialisation in the sector in question. Conversely, if
the home bias is not significant, we associate the sector with CRS-PC.17
of the “production boundary” in national accounts statistics supports us in making this
assumption: “goods and services produced as outputs must be such that they can be sold on
markets or at least be capable of being provided by one unit to another (…). The System [of
national accounts] includes within the production boundary all production actually destined for
the market” (OECD, 1999).
For estimates of “intra-country distances” we used the approach of Keeble, Offord and Walker
(1986) and Leamer (1997), who defined them as equivalent to a fraction of the radius of a circle
with the same area as the country in question.
5 This method may appear crude, but Head and
Mayer (1999) found it to produce strikingly similar results to a more sophisticated approach
that could draw on regional data for the EU. The main weakness of this approach is its
sensitivity to the choice of divisor x, which is arbitrary.
Having constructed the intra-country variables, we estimated equation (9) on data for 29
industrial sectors, 22 OECD countries and 16 years (1970-85) drawing mainly on the OECD’s
COMTAP database as made available by Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen (1997). This yielded a
data set with over 212,000 year- and industry-level bilateral observations. A full description of
variables and data sources can be found in Appendix 2.
We began by running several variants of equation (9) on the entire data set. These results are
given in Table 1. First, we simply pooled the data and estimated our gravity equation using
OLS (column (1) of Table 1). With the exception of the border dummy, all our coefficients
have the expected signs and magnitudes and are statistically significant. A coefficient of 1.31
on HOMEDUM suggests that ceteris paribus a country’s trade with itself is on average 2.719
is defined in all industries, whilst zero observations only appear for inter-country observations.
In view of the small proportion of zero observations in our data set (0.6% of all observations)
and of the resulting marginal impact on coefficient estimates, we proceeded nevertheless to run
the disaggregated gravity regression using OLS.
We also ran fixed-effects and random-effects panel models with year dummies to relax the
restriction of identical intercepts across years, countries and sectors (columns (6) to (9) of Table
1). In this instance, we found that the size of the estimated coefficient on HOMEDUM was
substantially larger than in the pooled OLS run (1.44-1.56 vs. 1.31). Imposing identical
coefficients across the three dimensions of our panel is clearly restrictive. This result supports
our approach of estimating the gravity model at industry level. Hence, our next step was to run
equation (9) separately for each of the 638 country-industry observations (22 countries*29
industries), so as to get individual home-bias estimates. We used fixed-effects panel
regressions, allowing for variation in year intercepts. The resulting coefficients on HOMEDUM
are reported in Table 2. These numbers are crucial to our subsequent analysis. They are
empirical proxies for hi in our theoretical model, and therefore represent the key ingredient to
the empirical test of competing paradigms.
It is worth taking a look at the results in Table 2 in order to assess their plausibility. Average
home biases across countries are shown in the rightmost column. The highest averages appear
for ISIC 313 (beverages), 311 (food products) and 312 (food n.e.s.). Given the strong home bias
implied in most OECD countries’ agricultural policies, this seems plausible. The lowest home-
bias factors are found for ISIC 354 (petroleum and coal products), 372 (basic metal products)
and 353 (petroleum refining). The figures in the bottom row of Table 2 report average home
                                                                                                                                                     
the domestic partner, even after controlling for distance and other cost factors, but it does not mean that the25
of international trade and specialisation patterns deserves explicit consideration. On the
empirical side, two types of data would be useful in refining the work reported in this study.
First, availability of country- and industry-level measures of trade costs would allow greater
confidence that the coefficient on home dummies in the gravity equation picks up the residual
effect due purely to demand bias. Second, more sectorally disaggregated data would likely
make for better approximations of what constitutes a “good” in competing theoretical
paradigms.26
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, James E. and Marcouiller, Douglas (1999) “Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias: An
Empirical Investigation”. NBER Working Papers, No. 7000.
Bergstrand, Jeffrey H. (1990) “The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model, the Linder Hypothesis
and the Determinants of Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade”. Economic Journal, vol. 100, pp.
1216-1229.
Brülhart, Marius (1998) “Trading Places: Industrial Specialisation in the European Union”.
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 319-346.
Brülhart, Marius and Trionfetti, Federico (1998) “Industrial Specialisation and Public
Procurement: Theory and Empirical Evidence”. CEP Working Papers, No. 974, Centre for
Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
Davis, Donald R. (1995) “Intraindustry Trade: A Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo Approach”. Journal
of International Economics, vol. 39, pp. 201-226.
Davis, Donald R. (1998) “The Home Market, Trade and Industrial Structure”. American
Economic Review, vol. 88, pp. 1264-.
Davis, Donald R. and Weinstein, David E. (1996) “Does Economic Geography Matter for
International Specialisation?”. NBER Working Papers, No. 5706.
Davis, Donald R. and Weinstein, David E. (1998a) “Market Access, Economic Geography and
Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Assessment”. NBER Working Papers, No. 6787.
Davis, Donald R. and Weinstein, David E. (1998b) “An Account of Global Factor Trade”.
NBER Working Paper, No. 6785.
Davis, Donald R. and Weinstein, David E. (1999) “Economic Geography and Regional
Production Structure: An Empirical Investigation”. European Economic Review, vol. 43, pp.
379-407.
Deardorff, Alan V. (1998) “Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a
Neoclassical World?” In: Frankel, Jeffrey A. (ed.) The Regionalization of the World
Economy, University of Chicago Press and NBER.
Evenett, Simon J. and Keller, Wolfgang (1998) “On Theories Explaining the Success of the
Gravity Equation”. NBER Working Papers, No. 6529.
Falvey, Rodney E. and Kierzkowski, Henryk (1987) “Product Quality, Intra-Industry Trade and
(Im)perfect Competition”. In: Kierzkowski, H. (ed.) Protection and Competition in
International Trade, Oxford University Press, pp. 143-161.
Feenstra, Robert C., Lipsey, Robert E. and Bowen, Harry P. (1997) “World Trade Flows, 1970-
1992, With Production and Tariff Data”. NBER Working Papers, No. 5910.
Feenstra, Robert C., Markusen, James A. and Rose, Andrew K. (1999) “Using the Gravity
Equation to Differentiate Among Alternative Theories of Trade”. mimeo, University of
California, Davis CA.
Greenaway, David and Milner, Chris (1986) The Economics of Intra-Industry Trade. Oxford,
Basil Blackwell.
Haveman, Jon D. and Hummels, David (1997) “Gravity, What is it good for? Theory and
Evidence on Bilateral Trade”. Mimeo, Purdue University, W. Lafayette (IN).
Head, Keith and Mayer, Thierry (1999) “Non-Europe: The Magnitude and Causes of Market
Fragmentation in the EU”. International Business, Trade and Finance Working Papers, No.
99/04, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Head, Keith and Ries, John (1999) “Armington Vs. Krugman: A Test of Two Trade Models”.
International Business, Trade and Finance Working Papers, No. 99/02, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver.
Helliwell, John F. (1997) “National Borders, Trade and Migration”. Pacific Economic Review,
vol. 3, pp. 165-185.27
Helliwell, John F. (1996), “Do national borders matter for Quebec’s trade?”, Canadian Journal
of Economics, 29(3), pp. 507-22.
Helpman, Elhanan (1987), “Imperfect competition and international trade: evidence from
fourteen industrial countries”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, vol. 1,
pp. 62-81.
Hummels, D. and Levinsohn, J. (1995), 'Monopolistic competition and international trade:
reconsidering the evidence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp. 799-836.
Helpman, Elhanan and Krugman, Paul (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Cambridge
(Mass.), MIT Press.
Keeble, David; Offord, John and Walker, Sheila (1986) Peripheral Regions in a Community of
Twelve Member States. Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
Kim, Sukkoo (1995) “Expansion of Markets and the Geographic Distribution of Economic
Activities: The Trends in U.S. Regional Manufacturing Structure, 1860-1987”. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 110, pp. 881-908.
Krugman, Paul (1980) “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade”.
American Economic Review, vol. 70, pp. 950-959.
Leamer, Edward E. (1997) “Access to Western Markets and Eastern Effort Levels”. In:
Zecchini, S. (ed.) Lessons from the Economic Transition. Kluwer, Boston.
Leamer, Edward E. and Levinsohn, James (1995) “International Trade Theory: The Evidence”.
In: Grossman, G. and Rogoff, K. (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, vol. 3,
Elsevier, New York.
MacKinnon, James G. and White, Halbert (1985) “Some Heteroskedasticity Consistent
Covariance Matrix Estimators With Improved Finite Sample Properties”. Journal of
Econometrics, vol. 29, pp. 305-325.
McCallum, John (1995) “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns”.
American Economic Review, vol. 85, pp. 615-623.
OECD (1999) Technical Note on OECD National Accounts. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris. (http://www.oecd.org/std/natechn.htm)
Polak, Jacques (1996) “Is APEC a Natural Regional Trading Bloc?” World Economy, vol. 19,
pp. 533-543.
Rauch, James E. (1999) “Networks Versus Markets in International Trade”. Journal of
International Economics, vol. 47, pp. 317-345.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Warner, Andrew M. (1995) “Economic Reform and the Process of Global
Integration”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1, pp. 1-118.
Scherer, Frederic M. and Ross, David (1990) Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
Trefler, Daniel (1995) “The Case of Missing Trade and Other Mysteries”. American Economic
Review, vol. 85, pp. 1029-1046.
Trionfetti, Federico (1999) “On the Home Market Effect: Theory and Empirical Evidence.”
CEP Discussion Paper, No 430, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of
Economics.
Tybout, James R. (1993) “Internal Returns to Scale as a Source of Comparative Advantage: The
Evidence”. American Economic Review, vol. 83 (AEA Papers and Proceedings), pp. 440-
444.
Wei, Shang-Jin (1996) “How Reluctant are Nations in Global Integration?” NBER Working
Paper, No. 5531.
Winters, Alan (1984) “Separability and the Specification of Foreign Trade Functions”. Journal
of International Economics, vol. 17, pp. 239-263.30
APPENDIX 2: DATA DESCRIPTION
Bilateral trade data are taken from the World Trade Database, and production data are from the
OECD Comtap database, both circulated by Feenstra et al. (1997). Since data recorded by the
importing countries were retained, all flows are c.i.f. Hence, our estimates of trade within
country can be considered conservative. Observations for which estimated intra-country trade
was, implausibly, negative (i.e. Output-Exports<0) were dropped from the sample. 366
observations, accounting for 0.48 % of total output and 3.73% of total trade in the full sample,
were thus omitted.
The following 22 countries are contained in our sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA, Yugoslavia.
A list of the 29 ISIC industries in our data set can be found in Table 3. Distance data measure
Great Circle distances between capital cities and are taken from Jon Haveman, Purdue
University (http://www.eiit.org/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html).
Inclusion of a remoteness variable in the gravity model has been advocated persuasively by
Polak (1996). LOGREMOTE is defined as follows (in the spirit of Helliwell, 1997):
] 2 [
, , , ￿ „ - + =
j i k t k jk ik t ij LOGGDP LOGDIST LOGDIST LOGREMOTE .
The linguistic groupings underlying LANGDUM are defined as follows:
English: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA; French: Belgium, Canada,
France; German: Austria, Germany; Dutch: Belgium, Netherlands; Scandinavian: Denmark,
Sweden, Norway.
The preferential trade areas underlying PTADUM are defined as follows:
EU: Belgium, Denmark (1973-), Greece (1981-), France, Germany, Ireland (1973-), Italy, UK
(1973-).
EFTA: Austria, Denmark (-1972), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK (-1972).
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: Australia, New Zealand.
The dummy for trade “closedness” is from Sachs and Warner (1995). The dummy is set to zero
if a country satisfies four tests: (1) average tariff rates below 40 percent; (2) average quota and
licensing coverage of imports of less than 40 percent; (3) a black market exchange rate
premium that averaged less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s; and (4) no extreme
controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports. It turns out that this measure is time
invariant in our data set. According to the Sachs-Warner criteria, New Zealand, Turkey and
Yugoslavia were “closed” for the whole time interval 1970-85, whilst the remaining 19
countries were “open” throughout this period.
Correlations among the variables of our testing equation (underlying Table 3, no. obs. = 9816):
Output SHARE IDIODEM IDIOBIAS
Output 1.000
SHARE 0.624 1.000
IDIODEM 0.219 -0.002 1.000
IDIOBIAS 0.287 0.364 -0.049 1.00031
TABLE 1: Gravity Equations: Full Sample
(22 countries, 29 sectors, 1970-85: 212,236 observations; dependent variable = log of imports+exports; beta values in brackets)
Pooled OLS Tobit Panel, fixed effects Panel, random effects




































































































































































Year dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
dummies
No No No No No Yes No (random ef.) No
Sector dummies No No No No No No Yes No (random ef.)
R
2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.58 n.a. 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
Note: All coefficients pass the t test at the 0.01% level, except those marked by #.32
TABLE 2: Estimated Home-Country Biases by Country and ISIC Industry, 1970-85
ISIC AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA JAP NOR NTH NZL POR SPA SWE TUR UK USA YUG Avg
311 0.83 2.61 1.84 6.47 2.65 5.37 4.94 2.11 9.11 1.76 1.19 17.39 3.80 1.55 -1.50 4.83 4.72 3.03 9.09 5.21 4.86 5.73 4.44
312 -8.97 n.a. 0.84 5.83 n.a. 3.58 3.37 2.13 n.a. n.a. 0.04 21.48 3.38 2.45 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.63 n.a. 2.85 3.69 n.a. 3.33
313 -8.40 3.54 3.33 6.24 6.23 3.47 4.79 1.86 9.85 -1.08 2.39 16.74 5.38 2.40 10.17 2.54 4.67 1.66 17.43 4.10 2.33 8.31 4.91
314 -27.60 3.52 -1.22 6.60 1.28 -0.09 2.96 -1.75 19.12 2.34 2.51 14.98 2.41 2.61 -78.78 6.35 7.61 2.69 n.a. 8.81 7.60 7.00 -0.53
321 -7.86 0.62 -0.20 5.48 0.43 2.15 2.73 1.19 8.33 -0.33 1.78 11.25 0.81 -2.10 -21.15 4.41 4.80 0.89 6.12 3.66 3.36 4.28 1.39
322 -4.24 -1.67 -3.19 6.58 -2.72 -0.84 1.68 -1.39 3.55 -0.95 -0.91 4.00 -0.50 -4.44 2.91 3.34 5.01 -0.87 7.31 0.83 3.87 5.58 1.04
323 -8.77 -2.52 -1.58 3.93 -1.91 0.59 2.40 -0.89 5.92 3.68 -0.23 19.78 0.12 -1.44 -0.52 9.05 4.48 0.16 7.59 0.62 1.19 5.01 2.12
324 -2.12 -0.02 -2.77 4.34 -0.60 0.68 1.50 -1.13 10.33 2.15 -0.02 -1.68 0.14 -3.89 21.62 6.69 6.25 -1.66 9.61 1.44 3.20 6.11 2.74
331 2.84 -3.41 0.96 5.33 -0.38 1.66 1.35 0.03 2.69 -0.05 -0.51 31.08 1.68 -0.51 -12.40 5.47 0.83 0.38 2.88 2.74 2.44 1.31 2.11
332 -0.60 -2.21 -1.15 4.55 -0.16 1.71 -0.07 -1.37 7.66 4.81 0.04 -5.04 1.57 -2.35 -8.39 6.64 3.30 -0.20 11.60 0.03 1.60 8.24 1.37
341 6.57 -1.86 -1.12 2.60 -0.28 3.86 1.20 0.41 3.00 -1.87 1.53 1.83 1.20 -0.75 -32.70 1.21 0.73 1.35 6.76 1.64 0.77 4.45 0.02
342 -10.32 1.77 0.88 4.44 1.61 3.64 3.52 0.60 8.29 4.90 2.93 14.00 2.72 2.77 -21.98 8.52 4.52 2.54 9.19 4.91 3.20 7.50 2.73
351 -9.97 -0.91 -2.00 2.75 -1.43 1.92 1.17 1.17 2.95 0.17 0.20 14.63 0.24 -0.54 -19.31 2.07 1.22 0.96 2.20 2.49 1.29 0.75 0.09
352 -12.56 1.84 0.89 4.88 -0.67 1.83 3.26 2.36 6.74 n.a. 1.28 20.62 1.76 0.02 -21.35 2.95 2.43 1.36 5.12 2.94 3.31 4.27 1.58
353 n.a. 4.53 -1.84 5.25 -1.94 3.61 1.07 0.15 4.39 -1.48 -1.72 27.92 0.89 -1.92 -65.81 3.45 -0.91 -1.79 4.65 0.21 2.81 -0.78 -0.92
354 -4.02 1.07 0.87 4.98 -1.29 0.38 -5.26 0.04 3.78 n.a. -2.14 -11.13 1.48 -1.72 -50.45 n.a. 1.54 1.14 9.37 2.60 1.99 4.16 -2.13
355 -12.14 1.23 0.09 6.54 -0.89 0.61 1.12 0.16 4.58 2.80 0.79 -9.18 -0.65 -1.04 -19.28 5.36 3.22 0.32 6.31 2.11 1.48 3.32 -0.14
356 -5.45 0.73 1.00 5.07 -0.87 1.37 2.39 -0.40 7.07 2.24 1.43 11.67 1.42 0.54 -18.24 4.72 4.56 0.19 8.03 2.06 2.76 5.22 1.71
361 -17.27 0.26 2.17 7.87 0.59 1.90 2.19 -0.52 n.a. 4.27 0.75 1.53 1.93 -4.12 -18.90 7.14 5.61 0.05 6.11 2.79 3.10 0.88 0.40
362 -6.13 2.51 -0.51 4.65 -0.91 1.41 2.38 0.94 2.57 3.44 0.11 14.24 0.59 -0.89 -24.15 5.35 3.08 0.77 6.02 2.69 1.83 4.11 1.10
369 -11.44 -0.11 0.80 5.88 1.72 2.95 2.13 0.94 5.66 5.70 0.30 12.21 2.65 0.77 -24.26 5.36 3.75 1.43 5.65 3.65 3.41 0.89 1.37
371 -10.55 -1.49 -0.65 5.72 -5.05 0.57 0.04 0.10 7.20 0.50 0.27 7.10 -0.27 -2.41 -39.77 6.41 2.06 0.41 4.73 2.70 2.05 1.61 -0.85
372 -8.40 -0.60 n.a. 3.82 -2.62 2.11 0.92 0.73 6.45 -1.47 -0.14 6.56 -0.09 -1.70 -49.29 2.96 2.04 -0.01 6.99 1.26 0.15 3.29 -1.29
381 -5.75 0.55 0.40 5.23 -0.24 1.44 1.51 0.98 8.27 1.96 0.80 -0.56 1.06 1.48 -12.51 4.81 4.14 1.73 7.17 2.78 3.05 3.90 1.46
382 -7.51 -0.55 0.59 2.50 -0.46 1.31 1.23 0.05 4.30 1.19 0.53 -1.12 0.59 -0.40 -17.93 2.75 0.55 0.92 8.21 1.24 1.22 2.69 0.09
383 -10.91 -0.41 -1.23 4.51 -2.03 0.36 1.97 0.58 5.65 3.43 1.19 1.71 1.06 0.45 -30.70 5.02 1.42 0.92 6.90 2.88 2.04 3.91 -0.06
384 -15.20 -1.42 -2.38 2.80 -1.37 -0.26 1.21 0.34 6.04 4.57 0.94 4.62 -0.52 -0.72 -31.72 5.79 1.88 1.43 5.94 2.94 0.11 2.43 -0.57
385 -11.71 0.20 -0.83 3.26 -3.71 0.25 1.42 0.54 3.97 1.47 -0.50 6.12 -0.44 n.a. -31.19 0.89 0.98 0.37 5.09 1.69 1.51 2.60 -0.86
390 -9.94 n.a. n.a. 4.54 0.54 1.22 2.56 0.31 3.96 1.95 0.53 12.29 1.73 n.a. -23.72 n.a. 2.90 0.47 7.28 2.05 1.80 4.30 0.82
Avg -8.46 0.20 -0.30 4.86 -0.63 1.55 1.67 0.29 6.24 1.77 0.51 8.84 1.16 -0.67 -23.70 4.77 3.06 0.72 7.09 2.53 2.40 3.9033
TABLE 3: Industry-by-Industry Estimation of the Discriminating Criterion
(OLS with year fixed-effects, dependent variable = OUTSHARE; normalised (beta) coefficients, t values in brackets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISIC Description









311 Food products 0.88 (11.34)* -0.16 (-1.77) -0.15 (-2.38) 0.90 320 CRS 10.9 10.1
312 Food n.e.s. 0.82 (10.39)* -0.06 (-0.79) 0.22 (3.62)* 0.89 192 IRS 2.1 2.2
313 Beverages 0.99 (11.92)* 0.21 (6.41)* 0.03 (0.52) 0.86 317 CRS 2.2 1.9
314 Tobacco 0.56 (5.31)* 0.30 (5.71)* 0.49 (5.36)* 0.93 288 IRS 1.2 0.9
321 Textiles 0.91 (10.37)* 0.10 (2.01) 0.18 (5.13)* 0.93 320 IRS 5.3 3.3
322 Clothing 0.61 (9.03)* 0.17 (7.35)* 0.34 (5.91)* 0.96 306 IRS 2.6 1.7
323 Leather goods 1.13 (9.35)* 0.43 (4.41)* 0.15 (4.58)* 0.84 320 IRS 0.4 0.3
324 Leather footwear 0.95 (17.87)* 0.19 (4.67)* -0.03 (-0.84) 0.83 311 CRS 0.6 0.4
331 Wood products 0.92 (10.19) 0.14 (1.90) 0.10 (1.45) 0.88 308 CRS 2.1 1.9
332 Furniture etc. 0.88 (7.77)* 0.02 (0.78) -0.12 (-3.68)* 0.87 320 ? 1.3 1.2
341 Paper products 0.36 (5.35)* 0.41 (10.28)* 0.41 (8.51)* 0.96 319 IRS 3.7 3.6
342 Printing and publishing 0.81 (9.51)* 0.23 (4.98)* 0.10 (3.14)* 0.87 320 IRS 3.7 3.8
351 Industrial chemicals 0.84 (7.92)* 0.02 (0.66) 0.12 (2.91)* 0.83 320 IRS 4.5 5.6
352 Other chemicals 0.83 (8.16)* 0.15 (7.14)* 0.10 (2.53) 0.87 304 CRS 3.5 3.6
353 Petroleum refining 0.40 (4.40)* 0.55 (5.86)* 0.35 (5.01)* 0.88 320 IRS 3.4 9.6
354 Petroleum and coal products 0.89 (9.71)* 0.30 (9.73)* 0.05 (0.77) 0.82 288 CRS 0.4 0.6
355 Rubber products 0.93 (13.36)* 0.04 (1.01) -0.07 (-1.30) 0.90 320 CRS 1.2 1.0
356 Plastic products 0.55 (4.42)* -0.38 (-2.33) 0.78 (4.05)* 0.88 320 IRS 1.5 2.2
361 Pottery, china etc. 0.82 (4.77)* 0.91 (43.53)* 0.33 (2.60) 0.78 304 CRS 0.2 0.2
362 Glass products 0.90 (10.60)* 0.04 (0.88) 0.07 (2.02) 0.89 320 CRS 0.7 0.7
369 Other non-metallic mineral pr. 0.46 (4.78)* -0.16 (-2.43) 0.58 (7.83)* 0.94 320 IRS 2.3 2.1
371 Iron and steel 0.60 (6.61)* 0.18 (5.02)* 0.47 (7.15)* 0.95 320 IRS 6.4 4.9
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.82 (8.75)* 0.15 (3.36)* 0.12 (2.79)* 0.90 304 IRS 2.8 2.3
381 Fabricated metal products 0.79 (10.63)* 0.24 (5.99)* 0.09 (1.69) 0.91 320 CRS 6.7 5.7
382 Non-electrical machinery 0.86 (9.93)* 0.09 (2.30) 0.02 (0.28) 0.86 320 CRS 9.5 8.9
383 Electrical machinery 0.20 (3.20)* 0.29 (15.86)* 0.65 (10.93)* 0.96 320 IRS 7.3 7.4
384 Transport equipment 0.49 (5.10)* 0.37 (5.50)* 0.38 (6.54)* 0.93 320 IRS 10.8 11.2
385 Instrument engineering 0.46 (6.21)* 0.37 (5.79)* 0.21 (3.35)* 0.93 304 IRS 1.4 1.8
390 Misc. manufactures 0.73 (9.81)* 0.16 (2.82)* 0.16 (5.19)* 0.92 255 IRS 1.1 1.0
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 99% confidence level. t statistics are calculated on the basis of MacKinnon-White (1985)
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.